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Abstract 
In Opinion 2/13 the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the draft agreement on the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights was “liable adversely to affect the specific 
characteristics of EU law and its autonomy.” The Court in recent years has applied the principle of 
autonomy – a concept first developed regarding the relationship between the EU and its Member 
States – to the EU’s relationship with third states and international organizations. The EU’s increased 
interaction with external actors raises questions regarding the effects this might have on the integrity 
and unity of EU law and the EU legal order. What exactly does the principle of autonomy entail in EU 
external relations law? This Working Paper examines the case-law in which the Court has applied the 
principle of autonomy and argues that the principle is a more broad and all-compassing structural 
principle than is often presented. The Court’s focus is almost entirely on what might be called the 
negative dimension of autonomy; it is about ensuring that the EU legal order is protected from external 
threats. It is less concerned, however, with the positive dimension of autonomy, which entails 
providing the EU with the ability to act effectively as a distinct actor on the international stage. 
Keywords 
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 1 
Introduction 
Autonomy means self-rule. An entity that possesses autonomy has the ability to choose a path for 
itself, without the influence, direction and control of others. Autonomy, however, is not absolute. It 
does not so much describe an absolute quality of an entity, but the relationship of that entity with 
others, and in particular the ability of that entity to define this relationship.1 A legal body, such as the 
European Union, is “autonomous” in relation to other actors or another legal order. In the context of 
the EU, the concept of autonomy is closely tied to the notion of the EU as a “new legal order”,2 one of 
the foundational myths that were used to develop the building blocks of the Union legal order, such as 
direct effect and primacy. From its early days, this concept of internal autonomy— the idea that the 
EU is not only a new legal order, but also one that is distinct from its Member States – was 
instrumental in developing this EU legal order. As the EU developed greater external competences, 
and increased its interaction with external actors, questions arose regarding the EU’s relationship with 
third states and other organizations and the effects that this might have on EU law. It was in this 
context that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) turned towards external autonomy, 
that is, the idea that the integrity of EU law and the EU legal order should not be undermined by the 
international action of the Union or the Member States. While the internal and external elements of 
autonomy are closely entwined, this working paper focuses on the external element, an issue that is 
now an important one in the law of EU external relations. 
The EU Treaties do not refer explicitly to the principle of autonomy, and it has mostly been 
developed through the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Although the term has only been employed in more 
recent case law, the principle has a longer history. Early discussions about the principle of autonomy 
focused on this internal threat, that is, the EU’s autonomy vis-à-vis its Member States. One can see 
how it would be difficult to develop an EU legal order if the Member States were able to dismiss EU 
law because it conflicts with their own legal systems or national legislation. The concept of autonomy 
was therefore important in developing the principles of direct effect and primacy, which are based on 
the idea that the EU represents a new legal order, one that differs from the system of public 
international law. Barents argues, for instance, that “[a]lthough the EC is based on a document which 
bears the name “treaty”, this has but a formal meaning. In a material sense the EC Treaty has the 
character of an autonomous constitution and, as a result, it constitutes the exclusive source of 
Community law.”3 In Costa, the Court refers to EU law as “an independent source of law”4 and makes 
a strong link between this idea of the EU as a “new legal order” and the concept of autonomy. The fact 
that the Union had legal personality and powers, exercised independently of the EU Member States, 
was not always self-evident, and had to be developed over time. The idea of the EU legal order as 
autonomous and independent played a significant role in this development. 
The focus on internal autonomy gave way to a protection of the external dimension of 
autonomy. The EU further developed its relations with external actors and has participated in its own 
right at the international level; it seeks to influence, and is influenced by, its complex interactions with 
                                                      
1 B. de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2010) 141, 
142: “the autonomy of EU law is not absolute but relative; it does not mean that EU law has ceased to depend, for its 
validity and effective application, on the national law of its member states, nor that it has ceased to belong to 
international law.” In this discussion on autonomy, ‘self-rule’ does not refer to the issue of kompetenz-kompetenz 
whereby a Court has the competence to decide upon the extent of its jurisdiction. 
2 Judgment in Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1: “"the Community constitutes a 
new legal order of international law” Judgment in Costa v E.N.E.L, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66 : “By contrast with ordinary 
international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system...” See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of 
Europe’, 100 The Yale Law Journal 8 (1991) 2403; J.H.H. Weiler and U.R. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass’ 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996) 411. 
3 R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004) 112. 
4 Judgment in Costa v E.N.E.L, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66. 
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other entities. As these interactions have become more common and more complex, a new “threat” 5 
emerged; the idea that EU law could be undermined, not only by conflicting national legislation, but 
by international law. This not only means that international law and EU law may come into direct 
conflict. It also means that international law may not always recognise the separate actorness of the 
EU, in the sense that it may view the Union, not as a distinct legal entity on the international plane, but 
as merely a reflection of the collective will of the EU Member States, or may treat EU law as simply 
an international law regime, with all that means in terms of hierarchy of norms and rules of treaty 
conflict.  The concept of autonomy, first developed with regard to the relationship between the Union 
and the Member States, became a concept that would help navigate the EU’s relationship with the 
wider international legal order. 
This paper discusses how the concept of autonomy has developed into a principle in EU 
external relations law and how it relates to other systemic principles such as effectiveness and 
coherence. It discusses how the CJEU has developed a relatively narrow principle into a more broad 
and overarching concept, one that determines how the EU should interact with other entities and the 
wider international legal order. Part 2 discusses the concept of autonomy in international law and 
international organizations. The principle of autonomy is not unique to the EU legal order, but is 
touched upon in discussions about international organizations generally. The paper then turns to the 
question of how autonomy has developed as a self-standing principle in EU law. It focuses on how the 
principle of autonomy has been given effect in two key fields of EU external relations. Part 3 discusses 
the principle of autonomy in relation to the EU’s participation in forms of dispute settlement outside 
those established by the Treaties. Part 4 then turns to the question of how the Court deals with norms 
that originate outside the EU legal order, in particular its relationship with international law. These are 
only two manifestations of the principle of autonomy, which has developed into a more all-
encompassing constitutional principle. This was revealed in Opinion 2/13, in which the Court ruled 
that that the agreement designed to allow the EU to become a contracting party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights was rejected because it “is liable adversely to affect the specific 
characteristics of EU law and its autonomy.”6 While the Court’s reasoning is open to criticism, its 
conclusions are perhaps less surprising when viewed as the latest judgment in a line of case law in 
which the principle of autonomy has developed into a broad and far-reaching principle. In contrast to 
some of the other principles of EU law and EU external relations law, such as the principle of 
conferral or subsidiarity, the precise meaning of autonomy, and the limits of the concept, are still 
being developed. The final part discusses how the Court’s application of autonomy can have negative 
effects. It discusses how, by seeking to protect the EU legal order, the application of this principle may 
also impede the effectiveness of the EU’s external action and compromises its ability to act on the 
international plane. The Court’s focus is almost entirely on what might be called the negative 
dimension of autonomy; it is about ensuring that the EU legal order is protected from external threats. 
It is less concerned, however, with the positive dimension of autonomy, which entails providing the 
EU with the ability to act effectively as a distinct actor on the international stage.  
Autonomy has been described as a “concept”7 or as an “idea”8 but should it be regarded as a 
legal principle in the same way as we discuss other principles of EU law? Principles, unlike rules, are 
norms of a fundamental character, and rules must conform to these underlying principles. Autonomy 
may appear quite different from other structural principles, such as the duty of sincere cooperation, or 
                                                      
5 M. Parish, ‘International Courts and the European Legal Order’ 23 European Journal of International Law (2012) 141, 142: 
“A new threat has recently emerged to the consistent application of EU law, namely interpretation of EU law by the ever 
growing range of international tribunals that sit outside the domestic legal order of any particular state.” 
6 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454. 
7 N. Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualizing the Autonomy of the European Union’, in R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International 
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011) 339: “The concept of autonomy has been embedded 
in the legal and political culture of the European Union and has been the harbinger of important legal and political 
developments.” 
8 R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011). 
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the principle of transparency. Indeed, autonomy is often presented as a more foundational concept, one 
that differs from other principles, such as direct effect and primacy.9 
The concept of autonomy was instrumental in developing these foundations of the EU legal 
order, but it was not until later that the concept of autonomy developed into a more concrete principle 
in EU external relations law. Principles are of a general character, but may be translated into more 
specific rules. In the cases discussed in this paper, we see how the Court translates the principle of 
autonomy into more specific rules. These are manifestations of the autonomy principle, not elements 
of the principle itself. For instance, the obligation under Article 344 TFEU, whereby EU Member 
States agree not to submit disputes on EU law to any method of dispute settlement other than those 
provided in the EU Treaties, is one such manifestation of the principle. The rule is designed to protect 
and preserve the integrity and unity of EU law. Yet one should equate these particular manifestations – 
such as the protection of the Court’s judicial monopoly – with the principle itself. Further, even in 
instances where the Court does not explicitly invoke autonomy, the underlying principle may still be 
the motivating force behind the Court’s reasoning. As shown in section 4, the principle of autonomy 
can help explain the Court’s approach to the reception of international law in the EU legal order, even 
if the term “autonomy” is seldom invoked explicitly. 
 
Autonomy in International Law 
The debate about autonomy arises not only in relation to the European Union; it is also a phenomenon 
that is discussed more widely in public international law. In particular, “autonomy” is debated in 
international law and international relations literature, when it concerns the degree to which 
international organizations exercise independent powers. This stems from a foundational issue at the 
heart of all international organizations. On the one hand, international organizations are composed of 
states, and their founding instruments are normally international legal instruments, often a treaty, 
entered into by those states. The organization remains dependent upon its members, both in terms of 
its legal existence, but also in terms of its day-to-day functioning. Decision making, funding, and the 
actions of an international organization often require the input of the member states. On the other 
hand, when an international organization with legal personality is created, a new legal subject is 
established, one that may possess a certain level of autonomy from its membership. This reflects the 
underlying paradox of international organizations: they are at the same time made up of states and 
constrained by their founding instruments, but have also been tasked with the powers and institutional 
structures to act with a certain level of independence from those states. As the International Court of 
Justice stated in Legality of Nuclear Weapons case, one of the intentions of treaties establishing 
international organizations “is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy”.10 The 
level of autonomy enjoyed by a given organization differs from organization to organization.  
The autonomy of international organizations is often presented as a positive development in 
international law.11 The international legal order is still one dominated by states. When an 
international organization is capable of developing a certain degree of autonomy from its members, 
this can be seen as strengthening international law, since an international organization may be more 
likely to achieve its foundational objectives without being hindered by the political interests of states. 
In this way the development of greater institutional autonomy addresses a certain flaw in the 
                                                      
9 J-W van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’ in R.A. Wessel, S. Blockmans, Between Autonomy and 
Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations (T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer 
Verlag, 2013) 13, 18: “In any event, the bottom line of this argument is that autonomy is not exactly in the same league 
as, say, primacy, fundamental rights protection or judicial review, but forms the premise upon which such fundamental 
principles of EU law are built.” 
10 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, 75. 
11 “For some time, in fact, the assumption amongst many international lawyers seems to have been that whatever 
independence and influence an organization gained at the expense of its member states was necessarily good for the 
functioning of the organization and, in turn, whatever was good for the functioning of the organizations was necessarily 
beneficial for the advancement of international law.” R. Collins and N.D. White, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in R. 
Collins and N.D. White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011) 2. 
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international legal order, that is, the fact that state interests and geopolitics can prevent an international 
organization from fully exercising its functions and realising its objectives. 12 This development of an 
autonomous legal order is thus often viewed as a form of institutional maturity.  In an international 
legal order which is characterised as decentralised, state-centric and lacking enforcement mechanisms, 
the development of international institutions possessing a greater degree of autonomy can be viewed 
as a positive development, one that strengthens the effectiveness of international law.13 
This phenomenon can be described as the “internal” dimension of autonomy. It refers to the 
relationship between an international organization and its members and the degree to which an 
organization exercises independent powers. While the autonomy of international organizations can 
have certain positive elements, states are wary of allowing an organization to develop too much, lest it 
become a Frankenstein’s monster, a body that is able to act without the necessary level of control by 
its members.14 
Autonomy can also describe the relationship from the other angle, that is, the relationship 
between the organization and public international law more generally.15 In this case, autonomy refers 
firstly to the extent to which the organization has become an independent actor in its own right on the 
international plane. It also describes the extent to which the legal order has developed to become 
somewhat “impermeable” to external influences.16 This argument can be found, for example, in the 
discussion of self-contained regimes in international law. A self-contained regime is a “sub-system” of 
international law; not only does it regulate a certain sphere of activity, it also contains its own 
secondary rules, largely (or completely) replacing general international law.17 The International Law 
Commission’s study on the fragmentation of international law recognizes that a system may develop 
into a self-contained regime over time.18 The EU legal order has for a long time been described as a 
self-contained regime in international law, 19 although whether the EU should be considered as a fully 
                                                      
12 “[T]he lack of institutional autonomy in international law is seen as the fundamental stumbling block in the way of 
realizing an international rule of law” R. Collins and N.D. White, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in R. Collins and N.D. 
White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011) 23. 
13 “[I]t cannot be excluded that autonomy has been seized upon by international legal scholars as a political banner under 
which one could demonstrate support for the role of international institutions – seen as a necessarily positive 
development – as opposed to the sovereign prerogatives of states, seen as harmful to the general interest.” J. 
D’Aspremont, ‘The Multifacted Concept of Autonomy of International Organizations: A Challenge to International 
Relations Theory?’ in R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, 
Routledge, 2011) 77. 
14 See A. Guzman, ‘International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem’, 24 European Journal of International Law 
(2013), 999. 
15 F. Dopagne, ‘Sanctions and Countermeasures by International Organizations: Diverging Lessons for the Idea of 
Autonomy’ in R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, 
Routledge, 2011) 187: “The autonomy of the international organization can indeed refer either to the relationship 
between the latter and its member states or to the link between the legal system of the organization and general 
international law.” 
16 “Autonomy as institutional independence is also what gives the organization the possibility of acting as an independent 
member of the international community.” J. D’Aspremont, ‘The Multifacted Concept of Autonomy of International 
Organizations: A Challenge to International Relations Theory?’ in R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International 
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011) 70. 
17 E. Klein, ‘Self-Contained Regime’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  
< opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>. 
18 ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 July 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702, para. 157. 
19 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 The Yale Law Journal 8 (1991) 2403, 2422. “The Community legal 
order … is a truly self-contained legal regime with no recourse to the mechanism of state responsibility, at least as 
traditionally understood,” 
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self-contained regime remains disputed.20 International lawyers are beginning to recognise that 
international organizations can also possess this type of “external” autonomy. 
The two elements of autonomy are closely entwined. Internal autonomy can be seen as 
beneficial to the international legal order, as it allows the organization to contribute to the international 
community by taking decisions independently of states. At the same time, as the organization develops 
greater internal autonomy, it may seek to act in a “state-like” manner by seeking to protect and 
preserve its institutional autonomy from external influences. In this way, the organization, like a state, 
begins to give normative priority to its internal legal order over obligations stemming from 
international law. The principle of autonomy, therefore, is not only relevant in relation to the EU legal 
order, but is a concept discussed regarding international organizations generally.  
While autonomy exists as a concept in public international law, it has developed into a self-
standing principle with a more precise legal meaning in EU law. In the context of the EU’s external 
relations, autonomy may be termed a structural principle in that it plays an important role in 
establishing the EU as an international actor with the ability to determine its interaction with other 
international legal regimes. The way in which this principle has been developed and applied in 
practice is discussed in the next sections. 
 
Autonomy and Judicial Competition 
One of the main ways in which the principle of autonomy manifests itself in the external relations case 
law is when the Court seeks to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law. These 
cases all relate to the EU and the Member States participation in forms of judicial dispute settlement 
outside the context of those set out in the Treaties. The Court has held that in principle, the EU and its 
Member States are open to use other such modes of settlement, and may join a treaty that employs 
binding methods of dispute settlement. However, the Court has set out certain conditions, the most 
important of which is that such participation must not violate the autonomy of the EU legal order. 21  
The Court’s aim is to ensure that no body other than the CJEU is capable of interpreting and applying 
EU law, even indirectly. It has been argued that this stems from the “selfishness” of the Court.22 De 
Witte, for instance, argues that the autonomy of the EU legal order “is put forward as a rhetorical 
shield to help to protect the Court’s own exclusive jurisdiction” in a way that is “rather unfriendly 
towards the “rest” of international law.”23  The principle of autonomy is not designed only for the 
benefit of the Court, however; it is also for the benefit of the EU legal order. The Court’s desire to 
ensure uniform and consistent interpretation of EU law stands as a valid reason for asserting 
autonomy. Seen in this way, the Court’s protection of its judicial monopoly is a means by which to 
preserve this autonomy, and is not only motivated by a need to preserve its own prerogatives and 
powers. One can understand how rival courts and tribunals interpreting EU law in a way that diverges 
from that of the CJEU may have the effect of undermining the unity and consistent application of EU 
law. The problem, however, is that the preservation of this goal can often come at the expense of 
another important goal, namely the EU’s effective participation in the international legal order. 
 
 
                                                      
20 See B. Simma and D. Pulkowski ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ 17 European 
Journal of International Law 3 (2006) 483, 518. 
21 See Opinion 1/91 (EEA Agreement) EU:C:1991:490, para. 40: “An international agreement providing for such a system of 
courts is in principle compatible with Community law. The Community's competence in the field of international 
relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of 
a court which is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its 
provisions.” 
22 B. de Witte, ‘A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement Beyond the 
European Union’ in M. Cremona and A. Thies, The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: 
Constitutional Challenges (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). 
23 B. de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2010) 141, 
150. 
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The Court’s judicial monopoly is safeguarded by Article 344 TFEU: 
 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein. 
 
It is not self-evident that this provision is intended to apply to the participation of the EU Member 
States in international dispute settlement mechanisms. Since MOX Plant24 this provision has been 
applied to the participation of the EU and the Member States within international dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Article 344 TFEU raises a number of questions.What should be considered another 
“method of settlement”, especially when there is a vast array of dispute settlement mechanisms? Does 
this apply only to judicial bodies, or also to non-judicial dispute resolution procedures? When does a 
dispute concern the “interpretation or application of the Treaties”? Is this the case, for example, when 
the rival court or tribunal is called upon to interpret EU law only indirectly, such as provisions of an 
agreement that closely resemble EU law? Moreover, does it apply to interpretations of EU law that are 
merely incidental or procedural, such as in identifying the appropriate party in a case? Or, more 
radically, does it mean that the EU is prevented from joining a dispute settlement body simply because 
there is a possibility that Member States might bring claims against one another concerning EU law? Is 
it concerned only with inter-Member State disputes or is it an expression of a more general principle 
of exclusivity of jurisdiction? In answering these questions, the Court has had to strike a balance 
between preserving its judicial monopoly one the one hand and allowing the EU to participate in 
international dispute settlement on the other. 
The Court addressed many of these questions in MOX Plant,25 a case that arose from a dispute 
between the UK and Ireland regarding a nuclear facility situated on a site at Sellafield, UK, on the 
coast of the Irish Sea. Ireland instituted arbitral proceedings against the UK at the international level, 
pursuant to the dispute settlement provisions in UNCLOS.26 The European Commission regarded 
Ireland’s use of arbitral proceedings as a violation of EU law and brought proceedings against Ireland 
for inter alia failing to fulfil its obligations under Article 292 TEC (now Article. 344 TFEU). While 
the arbitral tribunal considered that it had prima facie jurisdiction, it noted that the dispute between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom before the CJEU would be binding under EU law, and might 
therefore lead to conflicting decisions. The Tribunal decided to suspend the proceedings.27 
The Commission argued that the dispute between Ireland and the UK was essentially a dispute 
concerning the interpretation of EU law, and that the CJEU therefore had exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute. The Court found that Ireland, by submitting the dispute to arbitral tribunal, had breached 
its obligation under Art 292 TEC (now Art 344 TFEU). The judgment drew a certain amount of 
criticism, from academics in both EU law and international law.28 Klabbers, for instance, argued that 
“the Court’s attitude is worrisome: it does aspire to build a fence around EU law, thus running the risk 
of placing the EU outside international law.”29 Prost argued that the judgment “artificially 
‘Communitarises’ whole portions of the law of the sea and asserts, in absolute terms, the autonomy 
and superiority of the Community system over the universal regime of the UN.”30 Much of the 
                                                      
24 Judgment in Commission v. Ireland, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345 (‘MOX Plant’). 
25 Judgment in Commission v. Ireland, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345 (‘MOX Plant’). 
26 Art. 287 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Article 1, Annex VII, UNCLOS. 
27 See President's Statement of June 13, 2003, Ireland v. United Kingdom (“MOX Plant Case”) <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148>, para. 11. “The Tribunal considers that a situation in which there might be two 
conflicting decisions on the same issues would not be helpful to the resolution of this international dispute. Nor would 
such a situation be in accord with the dictates of mutual respect and comity that should exist between judicial institutions 
deciding on rights and obligations as between States, and entrusted with the function of assisting States in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes that arise between them.” 
28 “For an international lawyer, this is a stunning case.” M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, 
Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’ European Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2007).  
29 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 148. 
30 M. Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012), 42-43. 
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criticism stemmed from the fact that the Court examined the issues solely through the lens of EU law, 
without acknowledging that the wider dispute concerned issues of international law and dispute 
settlement.31  The judgment is also important in that the Court invoked the principle of autonomy in 
order to determine the relationship between EU law and the international legal order more generally. It 
held that an international agreement could not “affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the 
Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system.”32 Autonomy is not used 
here just to preserve the role of the Court, but as a way to protect the allocation of responsibilities in 
the EU legal order. 
In Mox Plant, Article 292 TEC (now Article 344 TFEU) was used as a means to prevent 
Member States from bringing disputes against one another involving EU law. It allowed the 
Commission to initiate proceedings on the basis of Article 344 in cases where a Member State has 
made use of international dispute settlement processes against another EU Member State. But could 
the very possibility of the Member States bringing these proceedings in the first place violate Article 
344? This question was addressed in Opinion 2/13. Article 33 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) allows Contracting Parties to bring inter-state disputes. The Court found that the “very 
existence of such a possibility” of the EU or Member States utilizing Article 33 ECHR with respect to 
a dispute involving EU law would violate Article 344 TFEU.33  The Court stresses that the ability to 
bring such a dispute to the ECtHR “goes against the very nature of EU law.”34 It does not seek to 
prevent, as in Mox Plant, Member States from initiating proceedings against one another, it prevents 
them from entering into an agreement that allows for such a possibility. 
The issue of inter-state disputes does raise concerns about autonomy. This is because the 
ECHR Accession Agreement would have allowed EU Member States to bring proceedings before 
Strasbourg that deal with issues of EU law, without the CJEU having been able to address those 
issues. The issue of inter-state proceedings was also addressed in the View35 of Advocate General 
Kokott. However, as she rightly points out such an issue can be fully addressed using the EU’s own 
institutional framework, such as the Commission initiating proceedings against the Member State, as 
was the case in Mox Plant. Kokott also stresses that numerous international agreements to which the 
EU and the Member States are party already allow for inter-state proceedings. If it were the case that a 
proposed agreement must expressly forbid inter-state cases in order to be valid under EU law, then 
“this would implicitly mean that numerous international agreements which the EU has signed in the 
past are vitiated by a defect, because no such clauses are included in them.”36  
The Court is requiring a principle of EU law, one that is already adequately safeguarded using 
the EU’s own constitutional controls, to be addressed through a clause in an international agreement.  
By requiring “the express exclusion of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction”37 over these inter-state disputes, the 
Court significantly expands the requirements under Article 344. It does not merely require Member 
States to refrain from a certain action; it obliges them to include in an international agreement a 
provision that excludes the dispute settlement body’s jurisdiction over certain cases. No such clause 
can be found in the WTO Agreement or UNCLOS, and the Court does not explain clearly why the 
                                                      
31 “[T]he Court analysed matters primarily, if not solely, through the prism of Community law.” S. Boelaert-Suominen, ‘The 
European Community, the European Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea’, 23 The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 4 (2008) 643–713. 
32 MOX Plant, supra note 25, para. 123. 
33 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para 208. 
34 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para 212. 
35 Opinion 2/13, View of AG Kokott, EU:C:2014:247, para. 118: “In my view, the possibility of conducting infringement 
proceedings (Articles 258 TFEU to 260 TFEU) against Member States that bring their disputes concerning EU law before 
international courts other than the Court of Justice of the EU, with the added possibility that interim measures may be 
prescribed within those proceedings if necessary (Article 279 TFEU), is sufficient to safeguard the practical effectiveness 
of Article 344 TFEU.” 
36 View of AG Kokott, supra note 35, para. 117. 
37 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 213. 
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ECHR situation differs from these other forms of dispute settlement. The Court’s rationale, that “if the 
EU or Member States did in fact have to bring a dispute between them before the ECtHR, the latter 
would, pursuant to Article 33 of the ECHR, find itself seised of such a dispute”38 applies equally to 
these other forms of settlement. This is an example of how the Court’s approach to the principle of 
autonomy emphasises the negative dimension, that is, the desire to protect the EU legal order from 
international law. Yet this requirement, by stipulating that the Union can only take part in dispute 
settlement procedures when such a clause exists, undermines the EU’s positive autonomy.  Such an 
interpretation of Article 344 jeopardises the EU’s ability to participate effectively in the wider 
international legal order. By requiring that internal issues be taken into account at the international 
level, the Court may have made it more difficult in practice for the Union to take part in these 
agreements.39  
The Court also employed the principle of autonomy in its reasoning in Opinion 1/91, in which 
it was asked to decide on the compatibility of the EEA Agreement with the Treaties. In contrast with 
Mox Plant, this and similar cases relate to proposed agreements that include forms of dispute 
settlement. The Court has held consistently that such a dispute settlement body should only have 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the international agreement at issue, and should not be capable of 
interpreting EU law. While this may seem a rather straightforward requirement, this can be quite 
complex in practice, particularly in the cases of a mixed agreement, where the EU and Member States 
are both parties. One of the questions that arose in relation to the EEA Agreement was whether the 
Court of the European Economic Area, established by the agreement, would be interpreting and 
applying EU law. In particular, since the EU and the Member States were parties alongside one 
another, the EEA Court would have had the power to determine who would be the correct party in a 
given case, either the Member State(s) or the Community. According to the Court, this conferral of 
jurisdiction would allow the EEA Court to rule upon the allocation of competences of the Community 
and the Member States, and therefore, would  “likely adversely [to] affect the allocation of 
responsibilities defined in the Treaties and the autonomy of the Community legal order…”40 Like in 
Mox Plant, the Court is essentially safeguarding its judicial prerogative, but it is doing so in order to 
protect the allocation of responsibilities in the EU legal order. 
We see similar issues being played out, for instance, when the EU seeks to participate in 
agreements covering investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms, especially now that the Union has 
competence in the field of foreign direct investment.41 The text of the Canada-EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) for instance includes a “domestic law clause” (Article 
8.31(2) “Applicable law and interpretation”) under which the Tribunal “shall not have jurisdiction to 
determine the legality of a measure, alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the 
domestic law of the disputing Party.” The inclusion of such a clause can be seen as being motivated 
largely in order to preserve the judicial monopoly of the CJEU to interpret EU law. Whether this 
would be enough to satisfy the Court, especially in light of Opinion 2/13, remains debatable, since it 
may still allow an incidental review of EU law.42  
                                                      
38 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 209. 
39 T. Locke, ‘The Future of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 
2/13: is it Still Possible and is it Still Desirable?’ 11 European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2015) 239, 255: “This 
stance again reveals the Court of Justice’s lack of trust in the EU’s own legal order. The consequence of this is that the 
EU is becoming an even more awkward partner on the international plane. Requiring the protection of the autonomy of 
EU law in a watertight manner requires an externalisation of internally resolvable issues, which is new and worrying 
because it makes the EU a difficult partner to deal with.” 
40 Opinion 1/91, supra note 21. 6.  
41 See H. Lenk, ‘Investor-state Arbitration Under TTIP: Resolving Investment Disputes in an (Autonomous) EU legal order’ 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) 2015:2.  Articles 206 and 207 TFEU explicitly mention “foreign 
direct investment” as part of the EU common commercial policy. 
42 Article 8.31(2) of CETA states that “the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of the disputing Party as a 
matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts 
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In Opinion 2/13 the Court discussed a different institutional innovation designed to protect EU 
autonomy: the co-respondent mechanism. This was procedure was designed to allow both the EU and 
a Member State to become parties to ECtHR proceedings and was introduced primarily in order to 
prevent the Strasbourg Court from making rulings on who is the correct party to a case involving the 
EU and/or its Member States, and thereby indirectly ruling on issues of competence.43 The CJEU 
found that the design of the co-respondent procedure still violated the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
In certain circumstances the ECtHR would have been asked to determine whether it was plausible that 
the conditions of co-respondency were fulfilled, thereby asking the ECtHR to make an indirect 
assessment of competence. According to the CJEU, interpreting EU law in such an indirect and 
incidental way still gives rise to concerns over autonomy.  
The Court summarised its position on what the principle of autonomy requires in Opinion 
1/0044 on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area. In a passage that has been referred 
to a number of times since, the Court states that the preservation of autonomy of the Union legal order 
requires two main features: 
 
[…] first, that the essential character of the powers of the Community and its institutions as 
conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered. … Second, it requires that the procedures for ensuring 
uniform interpretation of the rules of the ECAA Agreement and for resolving disputes will not 
have the effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal 
powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that agreement45 
 
Here the Court sets out two key conditions. The first relates to the preservation of the “essential 
character” of the powers of the Union and its institutions. The second seeks to ensure that an outside 
dispute settlement body would not have the power to interpret EU law if it is to have binding effect on 
the Union. This presents what was understood as a narrow understanding of autonomy. This narrow 
conception is focused primarily on preserving the exclusive powers of the Court to interpret the 
Treaties and EU law.46 De Witte, for instance, summarising the Court’s position in these cases, states 
that “the theme of the autonomy of the Community legal order is mentioned recurrently, and relates 
essentially to the preservation of the Court’s own exclusive power to interpret Community law.”47 
However, what we see in these cases is not the preservation of the Court’s powers for its own sake; in 
each instance a more fundamental issue is at stake. 
This broader conception of the principle of autonomy can be seen in Opinion 1/09. Here the 
Court was called upon to decide whether a proposed European and Community Patents Court (ECPC), 
which would have jurisdiction to hear actions related to European and Community patents, was 
compatible with the EU Treaties. One of the controversial aspects of the agreement establishing the 
ECPC was that it allowed the Patent Court to refer a question to the CJEU relating to questions 
concerning EU law. This was designed to be a way of safeguarding autonomy, by ensuring that the 
CJEU still has the final say on the interpretation of EU law. The Court stressed that an “international 
agreement concluded with third countries may confer new judicial powers on the Court provided that 
(Contd.)                                                                    
or authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or 
the authorities of that Party.”  
43 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, paras 215-235.  
44 Opinion 1/00, EU:C:2002:231 
45 Opinion 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, para. 12. 
46 T. Locke, ‘The Future of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 
2/13: is it Still Possible and is it Still Desirable?’ 11 European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2015) 239, 243: “A narrow 
conception of autonomy, such as this, is appropriate as it serves the legitimate purpose of protecting the integrity of the 
EU law while retaining the EU’s capacity as an external actor.” 
47 B. de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2010) 
141, 150. 
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in so doing it does not change the essential character of the function of the Court as conceived in the 
EU and FEU Treaties.”48  
What is an “essential” character or function of the Court? The CJEU found that one of these 
essential elements is the ability of the Courts of the EU Member States to refer questions to the CJEU. 
The preliminary ruling mechanism in the draft agreement would essentially deprive the national courts 
of this function in this field of law.49 This role of the national courts, the Court asserts, is 
“indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law established by the Treaties.”50 The 
judgment holds that the Member State courts have an essential role in the interpretation and 
application of EU law, and that this function cannot be delegated to the international level.51  Here we 
see that the principle of autonomy is not simply concerned with the judicial monopoly of the Court; 
rather, the Court links the concept of autonomy to the broader notion of safeguarding the “essential 
characteristics of the European Union legal order”.52 The Court is nevertheless still safeguarding its 
own authority, since the national courts are under the authority of the CJEU in a way that an 
international court is not.53 What constitutes the “essential characteristics” remains an open and 
debated question. Opinion 1/09 illustrates the broadening of the principle of autonomy, and can be 
seen as laying the groundwork for the rationale used in Opinion 2/13, discussed below.54 
 
Autonomy and International Courts 
The EU seeks to play a more active role in shaping, developing and strengthening international law. 
The support of international dispute settlement mechanisms should be a large part of this. International 
dispute settlement can help to bolster international law and the rule of law by establishing some of the 
features often missing in the international legal order, such as judicial review and enforcement. 
Participation in international dispute settlement by the EU is also a way to ensure that the Union 
observes its own international obligations. This would be especially important in the ECHR context, 
since there is currently no external mechanism to monitor the EU’s compliance with human rights 
norms. The Court has been reluctant to accept the role of other Courts, however. Parish argues that 
 
The Court of Justice should learn to be more relaxed about other international tribunals 
adjudicating on EU law. International courts are a growth industry, and it is inevitable that 
investment treaty law, international trade law, and a host of other areas of international law that 
international courts have mandates to apply overlap with the ever-expanding ambit of EU law.55 
 
The increasing number and density of international courts and tribunals of course gives rise to a 
number of challenges to supranational courts such as the CJEU. How, then, should the principle of 
autonomy be interpreted? The Court has interpreted it in a way that establishes a high threshold for the 
Union to participate in international dispute settlement procedures. Yet, as discussed in the next 
                                                      
48 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, para. 75. Emphasis added. 
49 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123,  para 81: “The draft agreement provides for a preliminary ruling mechanism which 
reserves, within the scope of that agreement, the power to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the PC while 
removing that power from the national courts.” 
50 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, para 85. 
51 See R. Barratta, ‘National Courts as ‘Guardians’ and ‘Ordinary Courts’ of EU Law: Opinion 1/09 of the ECJ’ 38 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 4 (2011) 297. 
52 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123,  para 65.  
53 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, paras 86-88. 
54 On Opinion 1/09 as a ‘warning sign’ see D. Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 
on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward,’ 16 German Law Journal 1 (2015) 105, 111. “The Patent Court 
Opinion, in turn, held that the application of EU law must remain in the hands of the EU judiciary, which includes 
national courts but excludes courts in which Member States and non-Member States participate together. Both were 
strong assertions of the autonomy of EU law and the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the EU’s constitutional 
architecture.” 
55 M. Parish, ‘International Courts and the European Legal Order’ 23 European Journal of International Law (2012) 141. 
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section, the principle of autonomy has also been used in order to determine the conditions under which 
international law – including the decision of international courts – can be given effect in the EU legal 
order. Since the Court is capable of playing this gatekeeper role, it should not be so reluctant to allow 
EU participation in international dispute settlement. The CJEU can and does give priority to its own 
rules and constitutional legal order. Yet in doing so, the Court should be mindful of the fact that there 
are many benefits associated with the EU and its Member States participating in this wider legal order. 
The Union’s ability to act independently on the international stage is an expression of the Union’s 
autonomy. 
 
Autonomy and Norms Originating outside the EU 
The previous section discussed briefly how the principle of autonomy has been used in the context of 
dispute settlement procedures, which is the main context in which the principle has been applied in 
practice. Yet the principle is employed in other aspects of EU external relations law, even if the 
language of autonomy is not used explicitly. The best example of this is instances where the Court is 
called upon to deal with the effects of international law within the EU legal order. As the EU enters 
into a greater number of international agreements and takes part in international organizations and 
other international bodies, international norms are increasingly invoked before the Court. This can 
range from provisions of treaty law, both binding and non-binding on the Union, customary 
international law, general principles of law, as well as a growing number of rules that might be 
categorised as “soft law”, which are not strictly binding but may nevertheless be influential. In recent 
years the Court has had to determine how to give effect to these norms, and under what conditions. In 
developing these rules, the principle of autonomy has played an important role.  
Some have argued that the principle of autonomy, as applied in the external dimension, means 
that the Court has become rather “unfriendly” towards international law.56 What this really means is 
that the relationship between the EU and international legal orders is to be determined solely by the 
rules in the EU legal order itself. It is not saying that the EU is no longer a part of the international 
legal order, nor that international law cannot have an effect within the EU legal order, but that this 
relationship can only be determined by reference to internal rules, and, more concretely, that the 
essential characteristics of EU law, especially the primary role of the Court in interpreting EU law, 
cannot be prejudiced by international law.  
The complex issue of the Court’s approach to international law has been discussed extensively 
in academic literature.57 In recent years the Court’s approach to international law has been described 
as being more “closed” or “unfriendly” towards public international law, often in contrast with its 
more open earlier case law, which was seen as being more receptive to international norms. The 
literature tends to contrast the CJEU’s recent emphasis on the autonomy of the EU legal order with its 
earlier “friendliness” towards public international law. Asserting the EU’s autonomy is therefore 
viewed as the CJEU further isolating itself from public international law.58 Respect for international 
                                                      
56 “[T]he EU has a much less friendly disposition towards international law than is commonly assumed.” J. Klabbers, ‘The 
Validity of EU Norms Conflicting with International Obligations’ in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti, R.A. Wessel (eds), 
International Law as Law of the European Union (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 112. 
57 F. Martines, ‘Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union’ 25 European Journal of International Law 
1 (2014) 129; C. Kaddous, ‘Effects of International Agreements in the EU Legal Order’ in M. Cremona, B. de Witte 
(eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008), 291–311; J. Klabbers, 
The European Union in International Law (Paris, Pedone, 2012); J. Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E. de Wet (eds), The 
Europeanisation of International Law. The Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States (The Hague, 
TMC Asser Press, 2008); M. Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and 
Judicial Avoidance Techniques (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013); K. Lenaerts, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct 
Effect of International Law in the EU Legal Order’ in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. van Elsuwege, S. Adam (eds) The 
European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) 45. 
58 F. Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice under International Law’, in M. Cremona (ed.) Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 56: “In other words, as the EC Treaty was not subject to 
ordinary international treaty rules, but rather interpreted from a constitutional perspective, the Community isolated itself 
from public international law to a certain degree in its ‘early strive for autonomy’.” 
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law and the preservation of the autonomy of the EU legal order are sometimes presented as mutually 
irreconcilable goals; the Court being presented as “oscillating between what may be called deference 
to international law and insistence on the autonomy of the EU legal order.”59  
The Court of Justice famously applied the principle of autonomy to explain the relationship 
between the EU legal order and public international law in Kadi I.60 The Court explicitly invoked the 
autonomy of the Union legal order in its reasoning, stating that “an international agreement cannot 
affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community 
legal system.”61 Kadi I is also important since it further underlines the fact that the principle of 
autonomy is not simply about preserving the role of the Court, but is a much broader constitutional 
principle.62 Autonomy is concerned with preserving the “fundamental characteristics” of the EU legal 
order. These include, according to the Court, the protection of fundamental rights, respect for the rule 
of law, and the judicial review of EU acts, all of which cannot be prejudiced by an international 
agreement. What constitutes the essential characteristics of the EU legal order is open to debate. In 
Opinion 2/13, the Court found that the principle of mutual trust was one of these essential 
characteristics.63  
The principle of autonomy also plays a role in cases where the Court is asked to determine 
which legal effect, if any, is to be given to agreements to which the EU is not a party, but all its 
Member States are. This question arose, for instance, in Intertanko, with respect to Marpol 73/78,64 
and Air Transport Association of America, with respect to the Chicago Convention on International 
Civil Aviation.65 The Court held that the obligations under these agreements would only be binding 
upon the Union in cases where there had been a full transfer of the powers under the agreement to the 
Union.66 The Court has set a very high threshold for the theory of functional succession to apply, and 
                                                      
59 H.G. Krenzler and O. Landwehr, ‘A New Legal Order of International Law’: On the relationship between Public 
International Law and European Law After Kadi’, in U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, D. Khan, A. Paulus, S. von Schorlemer, C. 
Vedder (eds) From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 1004. 
60 “The Court’s judgment in Kadi I is a further landmark in the process of defining the autonomy of EU law from 
international law.” P. Eeckhout, ‘Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or Integration?’ Current Legal 
Problems (2013) 1, 27. Judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461. 
61 Judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-
415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, para. 282. 
62 J-W van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law’ supra note 9, 17: “what spurred the ECJ’s appeal to the autonomy of the 
EU legal order was not so much a somewhat narrow concern for its exclusive jurisdiction, as a more general and more 
profound concern for the constitutional integrity of this legal order.” 
63 Opinion 2/13, para168: “This legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all 
the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as 
stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that 
those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.” 
64 Judgment in Intertanko and Others, C-308/06, EU:C:2008:312. 64 See J-W. van Rossem, ‘Interaction between EU Law and 
International Law in the Light of Intertanko and Kadi: The Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but not the 
Community’ 40 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2009) 183–227. 
65 Judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, C-
366/10, EU:C:2011:864. See G. De Baere and C. Ryngaert, ‘The ECJ’s Judgment in Air Transport Association of 
America and the International Legal Context of the EU’s Climate Change Policy’ 18 European Foreign Affairs Review 
(2013) 389. 
66 For a discussion on the Court’s use of the theory of ‘functional succession’ see J. Wouters, J. Odermatt, T. Ramopoulos, 
‘Worlds Apart? Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International 
Law’, in M. Cremona & A. Thies (eds) The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional 
Challenges (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 249. 
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this has only occurred in rare instances.67 From the viewpoint of preserving the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, one can see why the Court would pursue this approach. Allowing international agreements 
to which only the Member States have entered into, but which the Union has not, to bind the Union 
would go against the idea of the Union as a separate and distinct entity. To do so otherwise might 
threaten the unity of EU legal order. 68 
The principle of autonomy also plays a role in cases where the Court has been called upon to 
determine the legal effect of agreements entered into by the EU Member States before their entry into 
the Union. This issue is governed by Article 351 TFEU, which states that while international 
agreements entered into by the Member States before they joined the Union will continue to apply, the 
Member States are also under an obligation to eliminate incompatibilities between EU law and those 
earlier international agreements. This article has two elements; the first is about preserving the prior 
Member States agreements, while the obligation to eliminate incompatibilities is motivated by the 
need to preserve the integrity of EU law. In case law applying Article 351 TFEU the Court has 
emphasised the latter goal.69 This again can be seen as being motivated by the broader principle of 
autonomy.70 The prior agreements of the Member States must be respected, according to the Court, but 
this cannot undermine the unity and integrity of the EU legal order. Autonomy is put forward as a 
shield to protect this integrity and unity of the legal order.71 
In these instances, the Court is applying the principle of autonomy, a concept originally 
developed to assert the primacy of EU law over national law, to the EU’s wider relationship with 
international law. In both instances the underlying rationale is the same: since the EU is a distinct and 
autonomous legal order, it cannot be undermined by the invocation of norms that originate outside that 
legal order, whether they derive from the Member States’ legal systems or from international law.72 At 
its heart, this means that the relationship between EU law and international law is to be determined by 
the CJEU itself, according to its own constitutional principles. As Advocate General Maduro boldly 
stated in his Opinion in Kadi I “in the final analysis, the Community Courts determine the effect of 
international obligations within the Community legal order by reference to conditions set by 
Community law.”73 Kadi I and other cases stressing the autonomous nature of the EU legal order have 
                                                      
67 The most notable case being Judgment in International Fruit Company and Others v Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit, Joined Cases 21 to 25/72, EU:C:1972:115, para. 18. See also Case 38/75 NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 
EU:C:1975:154, para. 21. 
68 J-W van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law’ supra note 9, 36: “In Intertanko and Air Transport Association of America, 
the Court’s decision not to incorporate an international agreement to which the Union is not formally bound, primarily 
seems to have stemmed from a desire to defend the unity of the Union legal order.” 
69 See Judgment in Commission v Austria, C-205/06, EU:C:2009:118;  Judgment in Commission v Sweden, C-249/06, 
EU:C:2009:119; Judgment in Commission v Finland, C-118/07, EU:C:2009:715; Judgment in Kadi I, supra note61 para 
304. Judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 
C-366/10, EU:C:2011:864, para 61: “Although the first paragraph of Article 351 TFEU implies a duty on the part of the 
institutions of the European Union not to impede the performance of the obligations of Member States which stem from 
an agreement prior to 1 January 1958 […] that duty of the institutions is designed to permit the Member States concerned 
to perform their obligations under a prior agreement and does not bind the European Union as regards the third States 
party to that agreement.” 
70 Klabbers, for instance, argues that “while ostensibly safeguarding anterior member state agreements, [Art. 351] has always 
been more about achieving a balance between the protection of those earlier treaties and the protection of the autonomy 
of the EC’s legal order – and that is a charitable reading.” J. Klabbers, ‘Beyond the Vienna Convention: Conflicting 
Treaty Provision’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Geneva Convention (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 203.  
71 See N Lavranos, ‘Protecting European Law from International Law’ 15 European Foreign Affairs Review (2010) 265–82. 
72 “The reference to the autonomy of the Community system in its relation to international law echoes much older references 
in the European Court’s case law to the autonomous nature of Community law in relation to the law of its member 
states.” B. de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
(2010) 141, 142. 
73 Opinion in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-
415/05 P, EU:C:2008:11 para. 23. 
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been criticised for essentially isolating the Union from international law. De Búrca, for instance, 
criticises the Court for following an “internally-oriented approach and a form of legal reasoning which 
emphasized the particular requirements of the EU’s general principles of law and the importance of 
the autonomous authority of the EC legal order.”74 Autonomy is presented as a rather blunt instrument 
to detach the EU from international law. However, the reality is more nuanced, and is more concerned 
with the Court’s ability to determine the ways in which international law is given effect in the EU 
legal order. The next section discusses how the EU’s application of this principle can lead to some 
negative consequences; while the there is a need for the Court to preserve the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, this can and should be balanced against other goals and principles, including the EU’s goal 
of respecting international law.75 
 
Autonomy as a Structural Principle in Opinion 2/13 
The EU Member States included an obligation in the Lisbon Treaty, that “[t]he Union shall accede to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”76 It should 
be borne in mind that accession was one of a number of approaches the EU could have taken to 
address the fact that the Union was not a Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Union could have sought simply to strengthen its own internal human rights mechanisms. 
In fact, this is what it sought to do through the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
Alternatively, the Court could also have found the EU to be subject to the obligations under the 
Convention via the theory of “functional succession” discussed above.77 This would have meant that 
the EU would be subject to the obligations in the ECHR under EU law through implied succession, 
rather than the EU being formally bound as a matter of international law. It would also have meant 
that the EU would not have been able to participate in the institutional mechanisms related to the 
ECHR, most importantly the Strasbourg Court. Both of these approaches were perceived as inadequate 
and would have failed to address the gap in human rights protection stemming from the EU not being 
a party to the ECHR.  
It was decided that this gap in human rights protection should be addressed by the EU joining 
the ECHR as a full party. The legal significance of such as step should not be underestimated, both 
from an EU law and public international law perspective.78 From the perspective of EU law, it would 
be the first time the EU had opened up its legal order for external scrutiny in the field of human rights, 
with judicial supervision backed up by binding commitments under international law. From an 
international law perspective, this would be the first time that an international organization had 
submitted itself to a form of binding judicial review in the human rights sphere. It would also mean 
that the ECHR system would have to be modified to allow participation by a contracting party that is 
not a state. Accession, therefore, was not merely a cosmetic procedure; it would have had important 
consequences for both the international and EU legal orders. 
EU accession was to be a long process. An important step in the journey was the negotiations 
for a draft Accession Agreement, setting out the conditions under which the EU would accede, and 
outlining the changes that would be made to the ECHR to allow EU participation. In negotiating the 
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Agreement, the drafters, composed of the EU and the forty-seven Council of Europe members, had to 
balance two competing objectives. On the one hand, they sought to ensure that the EU would accede, 
as far as possible, on the same footing as other contracting parties. Not only would this ensure that the 
EU was not given special treatment, it would also help guarantee that the rights in the convention 
would be protected in a similar manner, irrespective of whether the violation stemmed from a Member 
State or from the EU. On the other hand, since the EU is not a state, and therefore differs in many 
respects from other state contracting parties, certain arrangements needed to be made to take into 
account this difference. The drafters had to strike a balance between treating the EU as a normal 
contracting party, while at the same time acknowledging the unique nature of the EU and its legal 
order. Importantly, the drafters had to ensure that any agreement respected the principle of autonomy.  
In addition to the principle of autonomy found in EU law, the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty 
also included further constitutional safeguards, set out in Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol 8.79 Article 
6(2) highlights that “…accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties” 
whereas Protocol 8 states that any draft agreement must also “ensure that accession of the Union shall 
not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions.” The text of the draft 
Accession Agreement and its negotiating history has been discussed in detail elsewhere80 The 
Accession Agreement introduced a number of institutional innovations to the ECtHR system, such as 
the co-respondent mechanism and prior involvement procedure. These were designed particularly to 
ensure that the autonomy of the EU would be preserved. 
In accordance with the procedure in Article 218(11) TFEU, the CJEU was asked to deliver its 
opinion on whether the draft Accession Agreement was compatible with the EU Treaties and EU law. 
In Opinion 2/13, the Court found that it was not. The Court based its negative opinion mostly on the 
argument that the modalities of accession enshrined in the Accession Agreement would violate the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. Opinion 2/13 is the most important judicial pronouncement on the 
principle of autonomy to date. Most importantly, it established the principle of autonomy as a broader 
and more all-encompassing doctrine than previously thought, and will have important ramifications on 
the EU’s future external relations.  
This working paper does not seek to explore further the Court’s reasoning in full.81 Rather, it 
seeks to understand a puzzling question. Why did Opinion 2/13 come as such a surprise? The Court 
did not have minor qualms over the Accession Agreement, issues that might have been remedied by 
amendments to the agreement or declarations made at the time of accession. This was essentially the 
approach taken by the Advocate General, who, although finding similar faults in the Accession 
Agreement as the Court, still gave her approval. Rather, the Court came at the Accession Agreement 
with a sledgehammer. 
The reaction to Opinion 2/13 was generally one of surprise and shock.82 Academic discussion 
prior to the Opinion did not see serious concerns with the Agreement. All EU Member States that 
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submitted observations to the Court agreed that the draft Accession Agreement was compatible with 
EU law and the agreement had the support of the European Commission, the Parliament, the Council 
as well as the Advocate General. Perhaps what made the Opinion all the more surprising was the fact 
that the Court itself played an indirect role in the drafting process. In particular, the drafters sought to 
address the concerns included in a Joint Communication of the Presidents of the CJEU and ECHR, 
which set out some of the essential conditions of any accession agreement.83 Some of the institutional 
innovations found in the accession agreement, such as the procedure to allow prior involvement of the 
CJEU, can be traced back to this document, which clearly states that such prior involvement would be 
a necessary condition. Given all of these factors, in addition to the clear legal requirement for the EU 
to accede to the Convention established by Article 6(2) TEU, one can see why Opinion 2/13 caused 
such surprise. In fact, it is not so much the outcome of the Opinion that is shocking as much as the 
language and legal reasoning used to support it. In contrast with the more conciliatory approach of the 
Advocate General, Opinion 2/13 adopts a more abrasive and assertive tone.   
What can explain this puzzle, and what does it tell us about the principle of autonomy? One 
possible explanation is that the Court was acting out of self-interest. According to this argument, the 
Court was simply against EU accession to the ECHR and sought to do all it could to kill off or delay 
this process. The idea is that the Luxembourg Court feared could not accept any judicial rival that 
would potentially rule on the legality of EU law. While this concern may have played some role in the 
Opinion, it is unhelpful to think of Opinion 2/13 as purely political. It is unhelpful because it 
obfuscates the fact that the Opinion was based on existing case law and legal reasoning. Until this 
point, however, this reasoning had not led to such a drastic outcome as in Opinion 2/13. 
The Court’s Opinion may seem less surprising when one examines the line of case law on the 
autonomy of the EU. In particular, the Court’s emphasis on autonomy is foreshadowed in Opinion 
2/94, the first time it was asked to decide on the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Referring to possible 
accession, the Court held that 
 
Such a modification of the system for the protection of human rights in the Community, with 
equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States, 
would be of constitutional significance and would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of 
Article 235. It could be brought about only by way of Treaty amendment.84 
 
Opinion 2/94 is often presented as being based on the lack of competence for the EU to accede. The 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty addressed this lack of competence by providing a duty to accede in 
Article 6(2) TEU. Although this addressed the competence issue, it did nothing to address the more 
fundamental questions raised by EU accession, the conclusion that such a step “would be of 
constitutional significance”. This underscores the paramount importance given to the principle of 
autonomy. Article 1(a) of Protocol 8 requires that the “specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law” be taken into account in the accession agreement and so this was included as an essential 
condition for accession. Yet the Court refers to the “specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU 
law” treating the two as separate but related elements.85 Despite there being a clear legal obligation for 
the EU to accede enshrined in the TEU, the Court emphasises that this still must be done in a way that 
does not prejudice the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
As discussed above, one can think of narrow and broad conceptions of autonomy. The narrow 
version tends to link autonomy to the powers and role of the Court. One of the recurrent criticisms of 
(Contd.)                                                                    
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Opinion 2/13 is that the Court appears to have applied a much broader version of autonomy than it had 
in its previous case law. Locke argues, for instance, that in Opinion 2/13 “the Court of Justice moved 
the goalposts and, without expressly admitting it, extended the meaning of the autonomy of EU law”.86 
The argument is that the drafters sought to safeguard autonomy according to the narrow conception of 
autonomy, whereas the benchmark used by the Court employs a much broader conception of the 
principle.  
The drafters of the Accession Agreement seem to have approached the question based on the 
narrow conception of autonomy, that is, that respect for the principle of autonomy essentially required 
safeguarding mechanisms designed to preserve the role of the CJEU. The Court is extremely critical of 
this approach: 
 
The approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the EU as a State and to give 
it a role identical in every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, specifically disregards 
the intrinsic nature of the EU and, in particular, fails to take into consideration the fact that the 
Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that relations between 
them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU 
are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law.87 
 
At first, this reasoning seems difficult to support. The accession agreement makes very clear that the 
EU is not a state; the Preamble even emphasises this:  “[H]aving regard to the specific legal order of 
the European Union, which is not a State, its accession requires certain adjustments to the Convention 
system to be made by common agreement.”88 The fact that a complex accession agreement was 
needed at all is based on the idea that the EU requires certain treatment for it to accede to the ECHR.  
The Court’s criticism, however, was of the approach taken by the drafters. That is, they sought 
to treat the EU as a state in all respects, but would include “certain adjustments” where necessary. The 
drafters started from the principle that each Contracting Party should be treated in the same manner, 
unless special circumstances required different treatment. For the Court, it was the other way around; 
the unique nature of the EU legal order should have been the starting point. These two starting points 
were so different that the Accession Agreement was possibly doomed to fail. The Court did not have 
problems with the technical design of the building, but with the very foundations on which it was 
built. This can only be rectified, not with modifications, but by re-building from the ground up. One 
could argue that such an approach goes against the clear will of the Member States, who included 
ECHR accession as a constitutional obligation. Unlike other international agreements to which the EU 
seeks to accede, the EU Treaties require the Union to join the ECHR. Yet the fact that the Court 
would adopt such an approach, in the face of such strong support, serves to emphasise just how 
important the constitutional principle of autonomy has become.  
The passage quoted above also shows that the external dimension of autonomy is concerned 
not only with the action of the EU, but also with the Member States, who have accepted that their 
mutual relations “as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member States to 
the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law”. The role 
and status of the EU Member States as parties to the ECHR, which would be transformed into a mixed 
agreement upon EU accession, would also be affected by the EU’s accession to the ECHR. This is 
quite different from the internal dimension of autonomy, where the Court emphasises the distinct 
nature of the EU legal order vis-à-vis the EU Member States. The external dimension of autonomy as 
a structural principle requires one to imagine the Member States as an important element of this 
structure. The effect of EU accession on the role and status of the EU Member States as parties to the 
ECHR is something that was arguably overlooked by the drafters and perhaps another reason why the 
Court’s Opinion came as a surprise. 
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Conclusion: The Evolution of Autonomy 
Autonomy is a somewhat paradoxical concept. In the context of international organizations, it relates 
to the idea that as a legal person the organization is both independent from, but at the same time 
dependent upon, its Member States. Similarly, the EU is the international organization that exercises 
the most independence from its Member States, and the Court has long emphasised the separate legal 
nature of the EU. Yet at the same time the Union is highly dependent upon the Member States in order 
to carry out its functions89 and they remain an essential element in the EU constitutional structure.  
This paradox also applies to the external dimension of autonomy. The EU has become a global 
actor in its own right and, especially since the Lisbon Treaty, it has espoused the principles of 
multilateralism and international cooperation. At the same time, its case recent case law has stressed 
the autonomy of the EU legal order, in a way that emphasises the Court as the gatekeeper able to 
decide the conditions under which international law can take effect within the EU. The way in which 
the Court has sought to preserve this autonomy has meant that it has appeared rather hostile to 
international law and towards international dispute settlement mechanisms. This approach to 
autonomy can in turn undermine another goal, the EU’s ability to become a strong and effective global 
actor. The EU is a part of, and seeks to participate in the international legal order, but at the same time 
seeks to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis that legal order: “On the one hand, the EU’s autonomy is a 
product of international law; on the other, it must distance itself from the international legal order to 
cement and strengthen its autonomy.”90 Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel point out this apparent 
contradiction: “The ambiguity lies in its claim to be an open society, which aims to play an 
increasingly active role in the global legal order, while simultaneously presenting itself as an isolated 
monad, safeguarding the autonomy of its domestic system of values.”91 Others have pointed out that, if 
the EU seeks to portray itself as a body committed to respecting international law, we should expect its 
Court to show a more open or integrationist attitude towards international law.92 It seems, however, 
that the opposite is the case in practice.93 The more the EU seeks to present itself as an actor in its own 
right at the international level, to participate in the development of international law, the more the 
Court seeks to stress the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
This may not be as contradictory as it first appears. Perhaps we should expect that an entity so 
tightly woven into the fabric – both of the international legal order and that of its Member States – 
would need to assert its autonomy even more strongly. Eckes argues, for instance, that because of the 
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nature of the EU legal order, it needs more protection than that of a well-established State.94 
According to this argument, we should expect the CJEU, as the guardian of the EU legal order, to be 
more assertive in protecting what might be viewed as threats to autonomy, both external and internal. 
The assertion of autonomy can be seen as a necessary reaction to greater interaction with other actors 
and legal orders.95 Autonomy in this respect is viewed as being closely interlinked with the EU’s 
constitutional maturity.96 However, the need to assert its autonomy in this way, especially the need to 
include specific clauses in agreements to protect EU autonomy, can also mean that the EU is not yet 
mature. 
There comes a point, moreover, when the assertion of the EU’s autonomy by the Court 
undermines the EU’s ability to participate effectively at the international level. This working paper has 
argued that the concept of autonomy is a broad one, and as Opinion 2/13 demonstrates, can sometimes 
lead to rather unexpected outcomes. It is not simply about safeguarding the role of the Court, but 
ensuring that the “essential characteristics” of the EU legal order are preserved. Such an abstract 
concept can have problems, particularly when the EU seeks to enter into international agreements and 
take part in dispute resolution mechanisms. Without clear guidance on the limits of the principle of 
autonomy, negotiators on behalf of the EU cannot be confident that certain clauses will not give rise to 
concerns. The Court in Opinion 2/13 essentially required that every possible legal issue, even if slight 
or hypothetical, be resolved in the accession agreement. Rather than showing faith in the robustness, 
flexibility and maturity of the EU legal order, the Court requires that safeguards be put in place at the 
international level.  
The principle of autonomy has also been used by the Court to develop the EU’s relationship 
with international law more generally. Without defined boundaries, it can be used to justify a more 
restrictive attitude towards international law.97 There are good reasons for seeking to preserve the 
integrity of Union law from being undermined by international law, yet autonomy should not be the 
only guiding principle in developing the EU’s relationship with international law. Autonomy should 
also take into account other principles, including the Union’s respect for international law. The EU 
exists in a larger world of other states and international organizations and benefits from participation 
and interaction in the international legal order; international law is in turn also strengthened by the 
participation of the Union in international agreements and dispute settlement mechanisms. Autonomy 
is currently defined primarily in terms of exclusion, even isolation, and not in terms of engagement 
and integration. Such an approach to the principle of autonomy can diminish the EU’s ability to 
participate in this system, and undermines many of the principles it seeks to protect. 
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